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Human rights are, literally, the rights we have simply because we are human.  They are equal rights:  
one either is or is not a human being, and thus has exactly the same human rights as every other 
human being.  They are inalienable rights:  one cannot stop being a human being, and therefore 
cannot lose one's human rights, no matter how horribly one behaves nor how barbarously one is 
treated.  Human rights are also universal rights, held by every human being, everywhere.  This 
chapter offers a conceptual analysis of human rights, a brief account of their historical evolution, 
and an introduction to some leading theoretical controversies.   
1.  THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS1 
Human rights are a complex and contested social practice that organizes relations between 
individuals, society, and the state around a distinctive set of substantive values implemented through 
equal and inalienable universal rights.   
A.  Human Rights as Rights 
"Right" has two principal moral and political senses, rectitude and entitlement, characteristically 
expressed in talk of something being right (or wrong) and someone having a right.  Denying you 
something that it would be right for you to enjoy in a just world is very different from denying you 
something -- even the same thing -- that you have a right to enjoy.  Claims of rights ordinarily 
"trump" utility, social policy, and other grounds for action (Dworkin 1977, xi, 90).  And you can do 
special things with rights.   
Adam's right to x with respect to Beth is not reducible to Beth's correlative duties.  Should Beth fail 
to discharge her obligations, besides violating standards of rectitude and harming Adam, she violates 
his right.  This makes her subject to special remedial claims.  Furthermore, as the language of 
"exercising" rights suggests, Adam is actively in charge of the relationship.  He may assert his right 
to x.  If Beth still fails to discharge her obligation, he may press further claims, choose not to pursue 
the matter, or even excuse her, largely at her own discretion.   
Exercising rights is cumbersome and costly both to the parties and to society.  It is thus to be 
avoided when possible.  Nonetheless, the power to claim rights distinguishes having a right from 
                                                 
1 This section draws heavily on (Donnelly 2003, ch 1, 2).  (Nickel 1987, ch. 1-3), (Shue 1996, ch. 1, 2, Afterward), and 
(Hayden 2001, ch. 16-22) cover similar ground.    
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simply being the (rights-less) beneficiary of someone else's obligation.  "Having" (possessing) a right 
is of special value precisely when one does not "have" (enjoy) the object of that right.  Possessing a 
right must not be confused with the respect it receives or the ease or frequency with which it is (or is 
not) enforced.   
Having a human right also should not be confused with enjoying the substance or object of that 
right.  The fact that people are not executed arbitrarily may reflect nothing more than a 
government's lack of desire or limited capabilities.  Even active protection may have nothing to do 
with a right (title) not to be executed.  Rulers may, for example, act out of their sense of justice, 
instrumental calculations, or a divine injunction that does not endow subjects with rights.  And even 
a right not to be executed arbitrarily may rest on custom or statute rather than being human. 
Human rights, as we shall see below, principally regulate relations between individuals, conceived of 
as citizens, and "their" state.  But as rights (entitlements) they do more than establish standards of 
political legitimacy.  They authorize and empower citizens to act to vindicate their rights.   
Human rights are not just abstract values such as liberty, equality, and security.  They are rights, 
entitlements that ground particular social practices to realize those values.  Human rights claims 
express not mere aspirations, suggestions, requests, or laudable ideas but rights-based demands.  
And in contrast to other grounds on which goods, services, and opportunities might be demanded -- 
for example, justice, utility, divine donation, contract, or beneficence -- human rights are owed to 
every human being, as a human being.   
B.  The Source and Substance of Human Rights 
Turning from the "rights" to the "human" side of human rights, the central theoretical question is 
how being human gives rise to rights.  To use an older idiom, what in (our) "nature" gives us 
"natural rights"? 
Needs is a frequent answer. (e.g. Maslow 1970, xiii, Green 1981, 55, Bay 1982, 67, Pogge 2001 
[1995], 193, Gordon 1998, 728)  But as Christian Bay, a leading advocate of a needs theory of 
human rights, admits "it is premature to speak of any empirically established needs beyond 
sustenance and safety" (1977, 17).  And how needs give rise to rights is obscure.   
When we look more carefully, it appears that human rights rest instead on man's moral nature.  They 
are grounded not in a descriptive account of psycho-biological needs but in a prescriptive account of 
human possibility.  We have human rights not to the requisites for health but to those things 
"needed" for a life worthy of a human being.   
The "human nature" that grounds human rights is more a social project than a pre-social given.  
Human rights are at once a utopian ideal and a realistic practice for implementing that ideal; a sort of 
self-fulfilling moral prophecy.  If the underlying moral vision of human nature is within the "natural" 
limits of possibility, then implementing those rights will make real that previously ideal nature.   
Human rights constitute individuals as a particular kind of political subject:  free and equal rights-
bearing citizens.  And by defining the requirements and limits of legitimate government, they 
constitute states of a particular kind.  
Contemporary international human rights law presents one politically important vision of this 
process.  There is a surprising degree of international consensus -- at least at the inter-state elite level 
-- on the list of rights in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (see Morsink 1999) and 
the 1996 International Human Rights Covenants. (http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/index.htm)  
As of October 2004, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights had 150 
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parties and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had 153 parties, 
(http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/RatificationStatus.pdf) representing 79 percent of the 
total UN membership of 191.  Few of the remaining states have expressed serious systematic 
objections of principle.   
These documents can be read as envisioning the mutual co-constitution of equal and autonomous 
citizens and democratic states fit to govern such rights-bearing citizens. (Howard and Donnelly 
1986, Donnelly 2003, ch. 3, 4, 11)  The state must treat its citizens not just with concern for their 
capacity to suffer and respect "as human beings who are capable of forming and acting on intelligent 
conceptions of how their lives should be lived" but with equal concern and respect. (Dworkin 1977, 
272)  The list of rights in the Universal Declaration is readily derived from this conception. (See 
Donnelly 2003, xyz) 
C.  Justifying Human Rights  
International human rights law, however, is silent about its theoretical foundations, except for 
scattered assertions that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" (Universal 
Declaration, Article 1) and that human rights "derive from the inherent dignity of the human 
person" (Covenants, Preamble).  The social contract tradition of political theory, which from Locke 
through Rawls has been closely associated with natural rights ideas, likewise simply assumes that 
they exist.  Human rights are absent from the traditions of Western moral theory, among 
deontologists and teleologists alike, from Plato and Aristotle, through Hume, Kant, Hegel, and 
Nietzsche.  Even today, general justifications of the idea or practice of human rights are peripheral 
to most theoretical discussions. (The principal exception is (Gewirth 1982, 1996).)      
For example, rights are absent from Kant's Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (1981) and the 
first part of "Theory and Practice" (1983, 61-92), which consider our categorical duties under the 
moral law; that is, right in the sense of rectitude.  The second part of "Theory and Practice," 
however, addresses "political right."  Here the discussion revolves around the rights of individuals, 
considered as human beings, subjects, and citizens -- roughly what we would consider human rights 
today.  Yet even as systematic a philosopher as Kant assumes rather than argues for the existence of 
these rights.   
I have thus suggested (2003, 40-41, 51-53) that we understand human rights as what John Rawls 
calls a "political conception of justice" rather than a comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral 
doctrine.  Because a political conception of justice addresses only the constitutional structure of 
society, defined (as far as possible) independent of any particular moral or religious theory, adherents 
of different comprehensive doctrines may, despite other profound differences, come to an 
"overlapping consensus." (1996, xliii-xlv, 11-15, 133-176, 385-396, 1999, 31-32, 172-173)   
This has happened nationally in the West, where Christians, Muslims, Jews, and atheists, Kantians, 
utilitarians, neo-Thomists, Critical Theorists, and post-moderns, socialists, libertarians, and many 
others have come to endorse -- for varying reasons and with varying degrees of enthusiasm -- the 
liberal/social-democratic welfare state.  The consensus is overlapping (rather than complete) and 
political (rather than moral or religious).  Nonetheless, it is of immense theoretical and practical 
importance.  I would argue that something very similar explains the wide international legal and 
political endorsement of human rights.   
Human rights, thus understood, do not depend on any particular religious or philosophical doctrine.  
They are, however, incompatible with fundamentally inegalitarian comprehensive doctrines.  But any 
egalitarian comprehensive doctrine could in principle adopt human rights as a political mechanism.  
And in practice, a growing number of adherents of more and more comprehensive doctrines, both 
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religious and secular, have moved in this direction.  For example, Muslims of various political 
persuasions across the Islamic world have elaborated Islamic doctrines of human rights that are 
strikingly similar to the Universal Declaration.  This seems analogous to the process by which 
Western Christians, who prior to the seventeenth century had never expressed their political 
aspirations in terms of equal and inalienable rights, gradually came to endorse the rights-based 
political societies of what have become modern liberal-democratic states. 
D.  Duty-Bearers of Human Rights  
Henry Shue (1996, 51-64) argues that most rights, and all human rights, entail three kinds of duties:  
not to deprive the right-holder of the enjoyment of her right; to protect against deprivation; and to 
aid those whose rights have been violated.  These duties, however, may be held by different actors.   
In both national practice and international law, duties to protect and aid fall almost exclusively on 
the state of which one is a national.2  Even deprivations by private individuals and groups are not 
typically called human rights violations.  If an irate neighbor blows up a house killing a dozen 
people, it is murder.  If irate police officers do the same thing, it is a violation of human rights.  If 
foreign soldiers do it during war, it may be a war crime.   
One might imagine different allocations of duties.  The rights of children in all societies are 
implemented primarily through families.  Many countries have significantly privatized old-age 
pensions.  In Singapore, children have certain legal obligations to support their aged parents.  Claims 
asserting duties of business enterprises not to deprive are appearing with some frequency today.  
And it does not strain credulity to imagine a world in which regional and international organizations 
acquire obligations to implement and enforce human rights.   
In practice, however, virtually all human rights today are implemented and enforced by states 
operating within recognized territorial jurisdictions.  Although the holders of human rights are 
universal, implementation and enforcement lie with states, which have duties to protect and aid only 
their own citizens (and certain others under their territorial jurisdiction).  Neither states nor any 
other actors have either rights or obligations to protect or aid victims in other jurisdictions.3    
2.  A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS4 
In the Western and non-Western worlds alike, politics and society typically have been organized on 
hierarchical rather than egalitarian principles, around duties rather and rights, and around ascribed 
roles rather than individuals.  Human rights are a "modern" invention initially developed in 
seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe and North America.  The history of human rights is the 
story of the (often violent) struggles through which political communities in the modern world have 
constructed a particular vision of the political requisites of a life of dignity worthy of a human being.   
                                                 
2 For brief accounts of the (extremely weak) international mechanisms that support implementation of international 
human rights treaties, see (Donnelly 2003, xyz, Forsythe 2000, ch. 3). 
3 A limited legal exception has emerged for genocide.  (Holzgref and Keohane 2003) and (Wheeler 2000) provide 
overviews of the current state of mainstream discussions of 'humanitarian intervention."   
4 See also (Ishay 2004), a lively and well-written history of "human rights" understood not as equal and inalienable rights 
but as any relatively egalitarian and moderately universalistic moral or political ideas, and (Douzinas 2000), an eclectic 
account combining critical legal theory with post-modern and psychoanalytic perspectives.  (Shapiro 1986) offers an 
excellent critical account of the liberal rights tradition. 
5
Donnelly: Human Rights
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2005
 5
A.  Early Natural Rights Ideas 
Greeks of the Classical era radically distinguished Hellenes (Greeks) from barbarians.  Aristotle's 
famous definition of "man" as a zoon politikon ("political animal") (Pol. 1253a2-3) held that a truly 
human life was possible only in a polis ("city-state").  Outside the polis -- that is, among barbarians -
- there were, at best, creatures capable of becoming men.  And rights, for which there is no term in 
the language, were peripheral to Greek understandings of politics and society.   
More universalistic ethical and religious doctrines attained greater prominence in Hellenistic Greece 
and Rome.  Nonetheless, Greeks and Romans continued to distinguish themselves categorically 
from barbarians.  (The Hebrew conception of the Jews as God's chosen people established a 
functionally similar qualitative distinction.)  And during both the Republic and the Empire, Romans 
thought about and practiced politics with no reference to universal individual rights.  
Medieval Christendom was ordered around hierarchical distinctions of birth, gender, religious status, 
and feudal obligations.  Natural law expressed natural right, in the sense of rectitude, not natural 
rights in the sense of entitlements. (Strauss 1953, Donnelly 1980)  The idea of equal and inalienable 
rights held by all individuals against society and political rulers, had it been seriously contemplated, 
would have been considered an abomination.   
The decisive break came in the mid-seventeenth century.  (Tuck (1979, ch. 1, 2) identifies important 
medieval and Renaissance precursors.)  The English Civil Wars provoked a wide range of assertions 
of equal natural rights (Haller 1965, Sharp 1983), including proto-socialist claims by Winstanley and 
the Diggers on behalf of the poor, oppressed people of England; Leveller tracts (Haller and Davies 
1944) by Lilburne, Overton, and many others; and the famous debates at Putney in the fall of 1647 
(Woodhouse 1938).  In "high theory," natural rights featured prominently in Grotius, Selden, 
Hobbes, and Pufendorf. (Tuck 1979)  Locke's Second Treatise of Government (1689) put equal and 
inalienable rights at the center of a prominent and influential political theory. 
In practice, "universal" natural rights were interpreted in highly particularistic ways.  Religious 
toleration was extended only to some Christian sects.  The political claims of high birth were 
supplemented rather than supplanted by natural rights, which were further restricted by a substantial 
property franchise.  Women were "naturally" excluded.  And none of this applied to "barbarians" 
and "savages."  
Nonetheless, natural rights did significantly undermine feudal and aristocratic privilege.  And, as later 
struggles have shown, the logic of equal and inalienable universal rights has a certain self-correcting 
character to it, by shifting the burden of proof to those who base their own rights on shared 
humanity to show why others do not qualify for those same rights.  The oppressed and despised 
have always had to force their way into politics, usually in the face of violent resistance.  But 
universal human rights have facilitated the entry of many oppressed groups -- beginning with the 
bourgeoisie -- over the past three centuries. 
B.  Expanding the Scope of Natural Rights 
Although natural rights were prominent in seventeenth century British political debates, the Bill of 
Rights (1689) refers principally to "ancient rights and liberties" and the powers and prerogatives of 
Parliament.  It has thus often been said that the Glorious Revolution was neither.  The American 
and French Revolutions were more genuinely revolutionary, rooting sovereignty in the people and, 
in their still famous declarations, basing political legitimacy explicitly on equal natural rights.   
These projects too were in practice limited by, for example, slavery, the exclusion of women, and a 
(reduced by still significant) property qualification for voting.  And for all their impact, they were 
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more the exception than the norm.  In the decades following the defeat of Napoleon, a conservative 
backlash predominated, especially on the continent.   
Nonetheless, nineteenth-century claims of human rights grew steadily more radical.  And they 
increasingly were advanced by the popular and working classes, now not only against royal and 
aristocratic privileges but also against the bourgeois beneficiaries of previous natural rights claims.   
This change is often presented as a shift in focus from civil and political rights to economic and 
social rights.  Such a reading, however, misrepresents both phases.  Economic rights were central to 
Locke's list of life, liberty, and property and Jefferson's life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.  
Conversely, nineteenth-century radicals and progressives agitated as strongly for extension of the 
franchise and equal civil and political rights as for new economic and social rights. 
Disagreement on the substance of economic and social rights certainly was a central line of political 
cleavage.  Both groups, however, treated civil and political rights and economic and social rights as 
interdependent and indivisible.  Although natural rights "for all" in practice typically meant natural 
rights "for us," both groups advocated the full range of (their own) civil, political, and economic 
rights.   
Our focus on human rights, however, should not obscure the fact that human rights continued to be 
rejected categorically by religious and secular traditionalists of various sorts, who controlled Russia 
and Austria-Hungary and remained powerful in most other countries.  Romantics, historicists, and 
many nationalists saw "nations" or "peoples" as organic moral entities that were both unequal and 
superior to individual human beings.  Scientific racism and Social Darwinism were powerful 
nineteenth century movements.  The leading work on natural rights in late nineteenth century 
Britain was David Ritchie's (1895) neo-Hegelian critique.  Etc. 
In fact, even among progressives the hegemony of human rights is, at best, only a late twentieth 
century phenomenon.  Most nineteenth-century struggles for political, economic, and social equality 
-- in sharp contrast to 1776 and 1789 -- were waged under a different banner.  Bentham (2002) 
famously described imprescriptible natural rights as "nonsense upon stilts."  Many other radicals 
rejected natural rights because they had been co-opted by conservative defenders of property.  Marx 
accepted them only as tactically and instrumentally valuable parts of the bourgeois political 
revolution that would be left behind by socialism.   
C.  Internationalizing Human Rights  
Dominant understandings of human rights have evolved primarily through new groups demanding 
full political recognition of their equal humanity by creating rights-based remedies to the distinctive 
"standard threats" (Shue 1996, 29-34) to their dignity.  The twentieth century saw notable progress 
in recognizing and responding to discrimination against women and racial and ethnic minorities.  It 
also introduced the victims of Western colonization into the ambit of human rights through the 
right of peoples to self-determination.   
In many ways, though, the most radical twentieth century innovation was the crafting of a system of 
global human rights norms.  The Universal Declaration presents itself as "a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations," an aspiration given some real practical significance by 
the development of international human rights law.  By the late 1970s and 1980s, the language of 
human rights had been reintroduced in most "progressive" political projects.  With the collapse of 
party-state socialism in Central and Eastern Europe and of developmental dictatorships and national 
security states in the non-liberal Third World, a loosely liberal-democratic vision of human rights has 
become hegemonic internationally.  Today, no vision of political legitimacy systematically 
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incompatible with internationally recognized human rights can hope to be taken seriously 
internationally.  And human rights has become the leading language of resistance in all regions of the 
globe.   
There remain marginalized and despised groups (e.g. the disabled and homosexuals) whose claims to 
equal rights continue to be denied.  National implementation of international human rights norms 
excludes many from effectively enjoying their human rights because of the accidents of birth.  The 
logic of universality, however, continues to be a powerful critical resource for combating 
exclusionary understandings and implementations.   
Universal human rights demand an unending struggle to realize an always evolving and receding 
vision of human dignity.  Equal concern and respect -- "All human rights for everyone," to use the 
slogan of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 1998, the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Universal Declaration -- will always contain a certain utopian element, as we develop richer 
substantive conceptions of human dignity and more fully inclusive conceptions of "all" human 
beings.  But it remains a realistic utopia (compare Rawls 1999, 7, 11-12, 126) that provides the 
means (human rights) for its own realization.   
3.  THEORETICAL CONTROVERSIES 
David Kennedy (2004, ch. 1) offers a brief but extensive and powerfully presented inventory of 
common criticisms.  Space restricts us here to arguments that challenge the universality of human 
rights, their individualism, and the tendency to rely excessively on (human) rights in pursuing social 
justice and human dignity.  Although this is a reference work, my presentation eschews bland 
neutrality.  While laying out the principal alternative views, I stake out clear substantive positions on 
these controversies. 
A.  Cultural Relativsm  
Many authors contend that nonwestern societies have indigenous conceptions of human rights that 
differ substantially from western/international understandings. (See e.g. Unesco 1949, Pollis and 
Schwab 1980b, Thompson 1980, Hsiung 1985)  Such arguments, however, typically confuse human 
rights, in the sense of entitlements that we have simply because we are human, with broader notions 
such as human dignity and social justice.  For example, Asmarom Legesse argues that "distributive 
justice, in the economic and political spheres, is the cardinal ethical principle that is shared by most 
Africans." (1980, 127)  Justice, however, involves much more than respecting rights.  And the rights 
recognized in traditional African societies were rooted in social status rather than shared humanity.   
Although most nonwestern societies have emphasized duties of rulers in areas currently regulated by 
human rights, those duties either were not correlative to rights or were tied to rights based on social, 
legal, or spiritual status. (Donnelly 2003, ch. 5, 7)  "Individuals possess certain obligations towards 
God, fellow humans and nature, all of which are defined by Shariah.  When individuals meet these 
obligations they acquire certain rights and freedoms which are again prescribed by the Shariah." 
(Said 1979, 73-74)   
However we read the past, though, we should not emphasize it too much in interpreting and 
evaluating the present.  It may be true, for example, that "the view of society as an organic whole 
whose collective rights prevail over the individual, the idea that man exists for the state rather than 
vice versa and that rights, rather than having any absolute value, derive from the state, have been 
themes prevailing in old as well as new China." (Kent 1993, 30)  But culture is not destiny.  It is 
dynamic and contested, constantly changing through often violent conflicts for control over social 
meanings.  Contemporary Chinese are no more bound by such traditional understandings than 
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contemporary Europeans are bound by their medieval and early modern traditions, which were 
equally distant from human rights.   
Elsewhere I have argued (2003, ch. 4) that human rights have a structural rather than a cultural basis:  
they respond to the distinctive threats to human dignity and the particular social and political 
opportunities created by modern markets and moderns states.  The universality of human rights is 
thus functional and historically contingent.  Markets and states have penetrated pretty much the 
entire globe and human ingenuity has (so far at least) proved incapable of devising more effective 
responses. 
In any case, the crucial fact is that more and more individuals and groups across the globe have 
come to interpret their religious, moral, and cultural values as supportive of, even demanding, 
human rights.  People with extremely varied cultural traditions -- consider, for example, India, Japan, 
France, and South Africa -- have embraced practices such as freedom of religion, social insurance, 
and the right to education.  And these and most other rights in the Universal Declaration are 
specified in sufficiently general terms to allow varied implementations that take into account local 
culture, history, and tastes.   
Human rights are neither tied to a particular culture nor incompatible with any egalitarian culture.  
Politically active individuals and groups across the globe instead are increasingly grappling with the 
meaning, for them, of "universal" human rights. (Compare Preis 1996, Nathan 2001, Svensson 2003)  
The universality of human rights is constructed by individuals, groups, and national and international 
political communities that have adopted the vision of equal and inalienable universal rights as a 
standard of political legitimacy. 
B.  Further Relativist Challenges 
Relativist arguments need not be based on culture.  Many are political -- and, in practice, many 
ostensibly cultural arguments are made by repressive elites whose behavior offends local cultural 
values no less than international human rights norms.   
During the Cold War, the universality of human rights was often challenged by arguments that 
different political systems may appropriately select different subsets of the list of internationally 
recognized human rights.  A minority in the West (e.g. Cranston 1973, Bedau 1979) rejected or 
radically downgraded economic and social rights.  Such arguments, however, had no impact on, and 
in fact were completely contradicted by, the practice of all European states (that is, the Western 
mainstream).  They were not even a very good description of the practice of the United States, the 
Western country least sympathetic to economic and social rights.  Analogous criticisms of civil and 
political rights, however, did dominate both ideology and practice in the Soviet bloc and much of 
the Third World.   
Theoretically, though, there are no categorical differences between civil and political and economic 
and social rights. (Shue 1996, ch. 1, 2, Donnelly 2003, 27-33)  For example, "positive" and 
"negative" rights do not match up with economic and social and civil and political rights.  Periodic 
and genuine elections, jury trials, and the presumption of innocence, for example, are positive goods 
and practices that the state must provide.  State restraint or inaction is at best secondary to realizing 
these rights. 
Today it is generally accepted that categorical subordination of one set of rights cannot sustain 
political practices that support a plausible conception of human dignity.   The 1993 Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action (par. 5) thus presents all human rights as "indivisible and 
interdependent."  The underlying vision of human dignity is comprehensive and integrated, the 
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whole being much more than the sum of the parts, and each set of rights contributes essentially to 
the realization of the other. 
A different kind of relativist critique presents international human rights standards as an instance of 
"false" universality.  Cultural-political versions of such arguments usually involve a claim that human 
rights are "a western construct with limited applicability." (Pollis and Schwab 1980a)  Feminists 
often present a more structural version of such arguments.   
"Human rights are gender specific.  …  Both in application and in theory, human rights are based on 
the male as the norm." (Peterson 1990, 305, Compare Agosin 2001)  The historic marginalization of 
women's rights issues is now widely appreciated and has become an important issue of remedial 
action locally, nationally, and internationally. (Askin and Koenig 1999)  Whether a deeper 
masculinist bias remains -- for example, in defining the boundary between public and private, in the 
adversarial nature of legal mechanisms of enforcement, or in the individualism of rights -- continues 
to be a matter of considerable controversy.   
C.  Individualism and Groups 
Many critics charge that human rights rest on a vision of "the isolated, lone individual, afraid of 
other humans." (Felice 1996, 57, Compare Strauss 1953, 248, Douzinas 2000)  In fact, however, 
many internationally recognized human rights -- for example, to freedom of association, to marry 
and found a family, to organize and bargain collectively, to freedom of religion, and to participate in 
cultural life -- have a primary social dimension.  Countries where internationally recognized human 
rights are most fully implemented, such as Norway and the Netherlands, bear no resemblance to a 
world of "possessive individualism." (Macpherson 1962)  Strong, attractive, and inclusive 
communities actually are facilitated by individual human rights. (Howard 1995)  Elements of 
atomistic individualism, such as the treatment of the poor in the United States, rest on and reflect 
systematic human rights violations rather than an unusually high degree of implementation.   
It is true, though, that all the rights in the Universal Declaration and the Covenants, with the 
exception of the right of peoples to self-determination, are rights of individuals.  The fact that much 
of the suffering in the world is rooted in group membership has led many to advocate establishing 
new collective human rights. (e.g. Marks 1981, Felice 1996)  The most powerful arguments for such 
rights appeal to a combination of protective grounds, rooted in a history of collective suffering, and 
expressive grounds, based on the contribution of the group to the meaning of the lives of its 
members.   
Many groups with strong protective and expressive claims, however, are incapable of effective 
agency, especially where the group is large, geographically dispersed, or heterogeneous.  Consider, 
for example, women almost everywhere and African-Americans in the United States.  "Group 
rights" that no one can exercise are largely an empty formula.   
In addition, if a group right is to be of any real theoretical significance or practical value, it must not 
be reducible to rights of the members of the group. (Compare Galenkamp 1993)  The right to self-
determination meets this condition.  Most other ostensible group human rights do not. 
The practical purpose of group human rights also is difficult to discern.  For example, Felice claims 
that "[group] rights based on race and ethnicity are necessary because of the often genocidal policies 
of majority groups" (1996, 58).  But can we really imagine a genocidal regime changing its behavior 
because of collective human rights held by that group?   
Perhaps the most serious problem, though, is that group human rights must be universal -- that is, 
held by every group of that type -- but virtually all persuasive arguments for group rights depend on 
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particular contingent conjunctions of protective and expressive arguments.  For example, even the 
strongest defenders of minority rights do not claim that every ethnic minority everywhere ought to 
have group rights, let alone the same rights.   
Such arguments do not categorically exclude group human rights.  An emerging exception would 
seem to be indigenous peoples, whose way of life is fragile, under attack, and fundamentally 
incompatible with mainstream legal and social institutions.  Most oppressed groups, though, need 
not new rights, either individual or collective, but a deeper commitment to, and perhaps new 
strategies for implementing, already recognized human rights.  It is hard to think of even a handful 
of additional types of groups that can advance strong protective and expressive justifications, have 
the capacity to exercise rights, and might achieve benefits with group human rights that cannot be 
achieved by effective implementation of individual human rights.   
D.  Rights, Justice, and Politics 
Human rights, however, do prioritize the rights of individuals, drawing attention away from 
(although without denying) the legitimate interests and claims of states, societies, and families.  
Human rights do deflect attention from duties, responsibilities, and other individual and societal 
interests and values that are part of any adequate comprehensive account of the good life.  We must 
be careful, therefore, not to exaggerate the place of human rights in our political practices, let alone 
in our understandings of morality or human flourishing. 
Human rights are not a complete vision of social justice or human emancipation.  They define (only) 
a limited range of political and legal requisites for a particular understanding of a life of dignity.  In 
principle, this is unproblematic.  Different moral, ethical, legal, and political practices appropriately 
play different roles in a well-ordered society.  In practice, however, human rights today often 
squeeze out, rather than complement, other concepts, languages, and practices.   
For example, in traditional families one's life chances are largely determined by family roles.  Such 
roles were, and remain, immensely fulfilling for many people.  For others, though, they are highly 
oppressive.  One of the great human rights accomplishments of the twentieth century was to liberate 
countless individuals, especially women, from the tyranny of the family.  If families have changed 
because of the choices of their members, human rights advocates see nothing requiring apology.  
Unless equality and autonomy extend to the family, all other human rights are unacceptably 
vulnerable.   
But the ways we implement human rights often have socially and morally perverse unintended 
consequences.  For example, the substantial financial disincentives in the United States to caring for 
elderly parents at home perversely weaken families and undermine important values of respect and 
responsibility.  More generally, when legal and political attention is focused narrowly on individual 
rights -- especially in a litigious culture, which an emphasis on rights fosters -- non-state mechanisms 
of provision frequently receive short shrift. 
There is also an unfortunate tendency to shoehorn all important social goods into a human rights 
framework, implicitly treating internationally recognized human rights as a one size fits all solution 
for all social and political problems.  This can choke off creative thinking about the meaning of and 
strategies for realizing social justice or human emancipation.  As the hegemony of human rights 
insinuates itself more deeply in more and more places, we need to be especially sensitive to an 
inappropriate imperialism of (human) rights.   
Human rights are not the last word on, but rather than one vital part of, a defensible conception of 
human emancipation or the good life.  Claiming a human right does not necessarily halt legitimate 
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discussion.  Human rights frequently conflict with one another.  Different defensible 
implementations of a particular right may have very different intended and unintended 
consequences.  In extreme cases, human rights may even appropriately give way to other values.  
Human rights are not "considerations overriding all other considerations;" "absolutes to be 
defended in all circumstances." (Brown 1999: 109, 110)  Rights are only prima facie "trumps."  The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 4) thus permits derogations from most 
enumerated rights.   
We must be careful to keep in view both sides of this fundamental, and inescapable, tension.  
Human rights are in an important sense "above" or "prior to" ordinary politics.  In many ways, their 
point is to take these guaranteed goods, services, and opportunities out of the day to day give and 
take of politics.  But human rights represent a kind of politics, not a politically neutral 
humanitarianism.  They reshape the contours of, rather than eliminate, politics.   
Human rights practices -- their respect no less than their violation -- both reflect and alter 
distributions of power, opportunities, and values.  The politics of human rights, and of 
accommodating human rights with other social values and practices, thus must remain a central 
theoretical and practical concern.   
For most of the past three centuries, the politics of human rights has been emancipatory.  
Historically, the claims of families, churches, ruling elites, societies, and states have, at least from the 
perspective of human rights, been overemphasized.  Even today, far more people suffer far more, 
and far more intensely, from oppressive social, political, and legal duties than from oppressive or 
limiting implementations of human rights.  And we do want claims of human rights, ordinarily, in 
their appropriate sphere, to put an end to, or at least radically restrict, further political discussion.   
But all of this can be taken too far, with unfortunate consequences for human dignity and social 
justice.  We must we avoid what Michael Ignatieff (2001) calls human rights idolatry.  And we must 
recognize, even seek out, what David Kennedy (2004) calls the dark sides of virtue -- which are likely 
to come to the fore unless we evaluate our human rights practices as critically and intensively as we 
evaluate other moral, legal, and political practices.    
Human rights are no more, but no less, than a standard of political legitimacy that specifies a set of 
social and political practices that aim to establish a framework for equal and autonomous 
individuals, acting separately and collectively, to make for themselves a world worthy of truly human 
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